{"id":154367,"date":"2025-12-23T13:38:55","date_gmt":"2025-12-23T19:38:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.thelocalvoice.net\/oxford\/?p=154367"},"modified":"2025-12-30T18:24:56","modified_gmt":"2025-12-31T00:24:56","slug":"dana-criswell-one-standard-in-court-the-constitution","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.thelocalvoice.net\/oxford\/dana-criswell-one-standard-in-court-the-constitution\/","title":{"rendered":"Dana Criswell: “One Standard in Court: The Constitution.”"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

American Rights, American Courts<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Foreign-law restriction bills\u2014sometimes branded \u201cNo Sharia,\u201d sometimes packaged as \u201cAmerican Laws for American Courts\u201d\u2014keep resurfacing because the concern behind them is real. And pretending it isn\u2019t real is how you end up with slow-motion \u201cworkarounds\u201d that only get noticed after somebody gets hurt.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Start with first principles: when an American walks into a courthouse, the Constitution is supposed to be the floor. Due process. Equal protection. Basic fairness. That\u2019s not negotiable, and it\u2019s not something parties can sign away for convenience. A statute that makes this explicit can serve as a clean, simple firewall:\u00a0our courts will not enforce any rule, judgment, or arbitration outcome that strips away core constitutional rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

That\u2019s not paranoia. It\u2019s prudence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Why these laws have a stronger case than critics admit<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

1) They put a bright line in writing.<\/strong>
Yes, courts already have \u201cpublic policy\u201d doctrines that can block enforcement of rights-violating foreign judgments or contracts. But \u201calready can\u201d and \u201cwill, consistently, under pressure, in edge cases\u201d are not the same thing. A narrowly written statute gives judges clearer direction and gives citizens clearer expectations\u2014especially in family-law and custody situations where people are vulnerable and power imbalances are real.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2) They address a predictable channel: private agreements + arbitration + foreign judgments.<\/strong>
In a global economy, cross-border contracts and arbitration happen every day. Most of it is normal commerce. But the same machinery can be used to smuggle in rules that would never survive direct scrutiny in a U.S. court\u2014particularly in disputes involving divorce, custody, inheritance, or coercive \u201cagreements.\u201d The UK\u2019s experience is instructive: the government\u2019s independent review concluded that \u201csharia councils\u201d have no legal jurisdiction<\/strong> and their decisions aren\u2019t legally binding under civil law\u2014yet the review still raised concerns about how these councils can function in practice, especially around religious marriage\/divorce and women\u2019s rights.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3) They respond to the real \u201cparallel system\u201d problem\u2014without pretending it\u2019s always official.<\/strong>
The strongest warning sign in Europe hasn\u2019t been Parliament literally replacing national law with religious law. It\u2019s been the growth of informal or community-based dispute resolution that operates alongside<\/strong> the official legal system and can pressure people\u2014again, often women\u2014into outcomes they wouldn\u2019t freely choose. Germany has wrestled publicly with the concept of \u201cParalleljustiz\u201d (parallel justice) and what it means for the rule of law in a plural society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n


And German courts, like other European courts, sometimes apply\u00a0foreign law\u00a0in family or inheritance matters under conflict-of-laws rules\u2014meaning law \u201cshaped by Islam\u201d can enter the analysis in certain cases, even as public-order limits still apply.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

So if the point is \u201cmake sure our courts never enforce outcomes that violate constitutional rights,\u201d that\u2019s a defensible legislative goal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where lawmakers still screw this up<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Being more favorable doesn\u2019t mean pretending the bad drafts don\u2019t exist\u2014because they do.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

1) Overreach can punish ordinary commerce.<\/strong>
If a bill is written so loosely that any foreign element becomes suspect, it can destabilize normal choice-of-law clauses and arbitration\u2014raising costs, inviting litigation, and chilling investment. That\u2019s not limited government; that\u2019s lawmakers playing lawyer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

2) Naming a religion is a self-inflicted wound.<\/strong>
If you write a statute that singles out Islam by name, you\u2019re asking for constitutional trouble and you\u2019re handing opponents the easiest narrative imaginable. Worse, it shifts focus away from the only thing that should matter: rights<\/strong>. Even the UK\u2019s own public discussion has been plagued by exaggerations and sloppy language (calling councils \u201ccourts,\u201d inflating their number, etc.), which muddies the issue and makes serious policy harder.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

3) Don\u2019t accidentally outlaw voluntary religious practice.<\/strong>
Adults are allowed to seek religious counseling and mediation. The state should intervene only when coercion, fraud, or rights violations are in play. A good bill protects liberty; a bad bill tries to micromanage private life.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

A better, more liberty-minded model<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

If a state is going to pass one of these laws, here\u2019s the clean way to do it:<\/p>\n\n\n\n